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TAXATION - FEDERAL GIFT TAX - CANCELLATION OF A PowER TO
DESIGNATE NEW BENEFICIARIES OTHER THAN THE SETTLOR - INTERRELATIONSHIP OF GIFT AND EsTATE TAX - Before the enactment of the 1924
gift tax statute, decedent created a trust for the benefit of named beneficiaries,
reserving to himself power both to revoke and to modify the trust. In I 9 I 9

1940]
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the decedent made a surrender of the power to revoke the trust by a writing
which reserved the power to designate new beneficiaries other than himself. This
latter power was renounced in l 924 after the effective date of the gift tax
statute. The Board of Tax Appeals 1 and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit 2 affirmed the commissioner's ruling that the gift became complete and taxable only upon decedent's final renunciation of his power to designate new beneficiaries. Held, the decisions below are affirmed. Sanford's Estate
8
'l.l. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 308 U.S. 39, 60 S. Ct. 51 (1939),
In the principal case there were two transfers of "economic substance" and
the controversy involved the selection of the proper transfer -upon which to
impose the gift tax. It was petitioner's contention that the gift became complete
in 1919 at the time of the cancellation of the power to revoke the trust, inasmuch as an exercise of the reserved power to modify the trust could not inure
to his own benefit." But the commissioner claimed that the gift remained incomplete until the surrender of the power to designate new beneficiaries,which took place after the effective date of the gift tax statute. Treasury regulations under both the 1924 and the 1932 5 gift tax statutes designated as a
taxable gift the termination of a power to revoke a trust, and it was so held
in Burnet 'l.l. Guggenheim. 6 But the question remained whether a gift was complete when the termination of the power to revoke left intact a reserved power
to modify the trust. Though the estate tax statute specifically defines the kind
of transfers subject to the estate tax,1 there is no comparable language in the
gift tax statute defining the transfers that are taxable ~ gifts. 8 However, the
decision in Burnet v. Guggenheim made it evident that in defining the transfers
subject to the gift tax, "the concept of a transfer <!,eveloped in re~pect of taxes on
estates was not to be disregarded." 9 The test adopted by that decision in determining taxability under the gift tax was whether the transfer was so complete
1

37 B. T. A. 1334 (April 13, 1938).
(C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 81.
8
Rasquin v. Humphreys, (U. S. 1939) 60 S. Ct. 60, dealing with the same
question, was decided the same day. See the reference thereto in note 14, infra.
4 If the petitioner's contention had been upheld, this transfer would have escaped
the gift tax, because the surrender of the power to revoke took place prior to the effective date of the I 924 gift tax statute.
5 By art. I of TREAS. REG. 67 (1924), under the 1924 Act [adopted without any
change of present significance by TREAS. REG. 79, art. 3 (1936), under the 193:z.
Act], the termination of a power to revest title in the· donor was designated a taxable
gift.
8
288 U. S. z8o, 53 S. Ct. 369 (1932).
7
Sec. 302 (d) of the 1926 Revenue Act, 44 Stat. L. 71, 26 U. S. C. (1934),
§ 411 (d), subjects to the estate tax transfers reserving power to "alter, amend, or
revoke." In Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436, 53 S. Ct. 451 (1932), it was held
that a disjunctive use of these words was intended.
8
In Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280 at 288, 53 S. Ct. 369 (1933), the
petitioner contended that powers for purposes of the gift tax were not to be treated
in the same way as powers for the purposes of the estate tax, because the language of
§ 302 (d) was placed only in Title I of the Revenue Act of 1924 (the estate tax)
and not in Titles II and III of the same act (the gift tax).
9
Hesslein v. Hoey, (D. C. N. Y. 1937) 18 F. Supp. 169 at 171.
~
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as to fall outside the scope of the estate tax statute. Two lower court decisions
ha4 held that a transfer was complete so as to escape the estate tax, even though
a power to designate new beneficiaries other than the settlor had been retained.10
According to these decisions the gift was complete as long as it was impossible to
revest title in the s_ettlor, regardless of the uncertainty of the ultimate beneficial
ownership. But, in reality, the right to control the disposition of one's property
is tantamount to ownership, and this fact was recognized in Porter 'll. Commissioner.11 It was there held that the retention of a power to change beneficiaries
was a sufficient retention of control to subject the transfer to the estate tax,12
thus overruling the previous lower court decisions on this point. The principal
case is an extension of the Porter decision. Since the retention of a power to
change beneficiaries is a sufficient retention of control to subject the transfer to
an estate tax, it follows that the int_er vivos cancellation of such a power is a
sufficient release of control to make the gift complete and subject to the gift tax.
The Court followed Burnet 'll. Guggenheim in making the test of the completeness of a gift the same as the test applied in determining whether the donor
has· retained an interest such that it becomes subject to the estate tax upon its
extinguishment at death. The principal case affirmed the position taken in
H esslein v. Hoey 18 that the estate tax and the gift tax as applied to a transfer
in trust reserving the power to designate new beneficiaries other than the settlor
are mutually exclusive; so that the continuance of such a power in the settler
until his death subjects the trust property solely to the estate tax, free of a gift
tax,1~ and the cance~tion of such a power during the life of the settlor subjects
10 Brady v. Ham, (C. C. A. 1st, 1930) 45 F. (2d) 454, and Cover v. Burnet,
{App. D. C. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 915. These courts construed the words "alter" and
"amend',' in § 302 (d) of the estate tax statute as synonyms of "revoke" and required
the possibility of direct economic benefit to the settlor before the transfer would be
deemed so incomplete as to become subject to the estate tax. This construction was
overruled by Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436, 53 S. Ct. 451 (1932).
11 288 U. S. 436, 53 S. Ct. 451 (1932), affirming (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) 60 F.
(2d) 673, holding that the transfer came within § 302 (d) even though the power
to amend could not be exercised in favor of the settlor.
12 " • • • there is no difference in principle between a transfer subject to such
changes and one that is revocable." Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436 at 443, 53
S. Ct. 451 (1932).
18 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 954, cert. denied, 302 U. S. 756, 58 S. Ct.
284 (1938).
u Hesslein v. Hoey, supra, note l 3, involved a transfer in which the settlor
reserved power to alter in any manner not beneficial to himself. It was there held that
no gift tax was payable on such a transfer so long as the reserved power was continued,
because termination of this power by death would subject the transfer to the estate
tax under the Porter decision. The correctness of the Hesslein decision was doubted,
but the position there taken is affirmed in the principal case and in Rasquin v.
Humphreys, (U. S. 1939) 60 S. Ct. 60, decided the same day. But existing Treasury
Regulations ate inconsistent with the doctrine of Hesslein v. Hoey. Art. 2 of TREAS.
REG. 79 (1936), under the 1932 gift tax statute, as amended in 1934 and 1935,
provides that the gift is complete where "the donor has so parted with dominion and
control as to leave in him no power to cause the beneficial title to be revested in himself."
In Rasquin v. Humphreys, supra, the Court refused to apply this 1936 regulation
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the transfer solely to the gift tax, free of an estate tax. Though these two
taxes are not mutually exclusive in all cases,1 5 it was deemed contrary to the
policy of the statute to require that two taxes be paid on this kind of transfera gift tax on the termination of a power to revoke, under the Burnet 'lJ. Guggenheim decision, and an estate tax when the power to designate new beneficiaries
is terminated by death.16 The principal case construed the gift tax as supplemental to the estate tax in order to reach a transfer which might otherwise have
escaped both taxes.
Robert M. Warren

retroactively to a transfer made in 1934. But the Court failed to hold this regulation
invalid, thus leaving a question as to its effect upon transfers made after 1936.
15 For example, both a gift tax and an estate tax may be paid on gifts in contemplation of death and also where the settler reserves an interest in a trust but makes
a complete gift of the remaining interest.
16 See the principal case, 60 S. Ct. 5 I at 57.

